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Playing the Odds: Pascal’s Wager and Decision Making in the Long Scholarly 
Conversation 
Douglas M. Black, Collection Development Librarian, Northern Michigan University
Abstract 
This talk explores some of the philosophical issues surrounding the nature of the scholarly record and current 
challenges in academic libraries. The discussion arises from a 2011 Chronicle of Higher Education feature on a 
widely influential 1979 article entitled “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making Under Risk,” which 
proposed a new model for how people assess risk and weigh decision factors. The theory has been applied to 
dozens of disciplines and cited thousands of times, and it has applications in academic collection 
development as well as everywhere else. It addressed the limitations of Utility Theory, which grew out of 
Pascal’s Wager (i.e., it’s safer to bet on the existence of God), but didn’t adequately explain how people—
gamblers and insurance buyers, for instance—actually weigh risks and make decisions. The pace of change 
and new demands facing libraries offer the opportunity to ask new questions about the nature of the 
scholarly record. Increasing ubiquity and transience of information, along with rapidly shifting notions of 
authorship and ownership, offer some interesting questions about the role of academic library collections in 
scholarly communication as a whole. 
Introduction 
In the academic library, we all know how difficult 
it’s become to keep up with increasingly rapid 
developments in information, and our current 
environment challenges our basic notions of what 
constitutes the human record (disclaimer: 
terminology here deliberately ignores the 
difference between “human record” and 
“scholarly record”). We feel increasingly like we’re 
doing a lot of betting, and I’m going to explore 
here the nature of that betting in the context of 
what we’ve traditionally thought of ourselves as 
doing. One way of understanding the problem is 
to consider ubiquity and transience. 
Ubiquity 
Here’s what we usually think of when we think of 
the scholarly conversation over the centuries. I’ve 
often used it in instruction sessions to help 
students think about attributing and synthesizing 
source material. It’s the standard view of how our 
understanding of the solar system developed. 
1. Ptolemy, the 2nd century Alexandria 
astronomer, formulated a geocentric theory 
of the universe, in which the sun and the 
other planets orbit around the Earth. 
2. Copernicus, in the 16th century, came up with 
the heliocentric theory that all the planets 
orbit around the Sun. 
3. In the early 17th century, Galileo (1564–1642) 
aligned his views with Copernicus but 
couldn’t fully prove it by observation. 
4. Around the same time, Johannes Kepler 
(1571–1630) worked out some laws of 
planetary motion, continuing the work of his 
mentor Tycho Brahe. 
5. Late in the 17th century, Isaac Newton did his 
work on gravity and showed its consistency 
with Kepler’s work on planetary motion, 
confirming Copernicus and Galileo. 
This sequence is one example of the long scholarly 
conversation into which we invite our students. 
We invite them into scholarly discourse and begin 
training them to think about how ideas connect, 
how we know what we know both as individuals 
and as humans, and how we advance what we 
know both individually and collectively (Berrett, 
2012). As we draw students in and forward, we 
engage them in creating new knowledge. That 
process, fundamental to the academy, lies at the 
heart of the problems facing the academic library, 
so long considered the repository of the scholarly 
record. 
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In 2011, the Chronicle of Higher Education (“The 
reach of ‘Prospect theory’”) charted the spread of 
an article called “Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The Chronicle feature showed the increasing rate 
of citations in a number of diverse disciplines. At 
the time, the Chronicle estimated that the 
Kahneman and Tversky article had been cited 
some 8,000 times.  
However, we can’t collect all of that information, 
especially not at below R1 level—and  R1s can’t 
keep up either. In the small regional university 
library, where we explicitly focus on providing a 
representative, not comprehensive, collection, we 
can’t keep up with what we feel we ought to be 
collecting. However, consider the academic trend 
(in the humanities, mainly) in the last few years 
toward emphasizing primary-source documents. 
Consider the proportion of the human production 
of knowledge that we’ve recorded and preserved 
over time, against the proportion of materials that 
we’ve never captured for preservation, especially 
primary materials: everyday shopping lists, letters, 
handbills, theatre programs, petitions, windshield 
flyers, all the gray literature that’s gotten away, 
receipts, S&H Green Stamp booklets, chain letters, 
all the e-mails...when we consider everything 
we’ve created against what we’ve managed to 
preserve, what becomes clear is that we’ve only 
ever preserved a fraction of it to begin with 
(Anderson, 2011). 
When ideas spread comparatively slowly and 
publication technology was comparatively 
expensive, it seemed realistic to think that we 
could keep track of human knowledge. But now, a 
given scholar in a given field can’t possibly read 
and absorb everything written in her field 
anymore, and studies are showing that scholars 
are reading and citing differently now 
(McClanahan et al., 2010). Put simply, it’s too 
much. When information products were valued in 
part based on their scarcity, then especially, 
collecting on behalf of a community made sense; 
first, because the collection itself represented the 
record of the community; second, few if any 
community members could afford to gain access 
to all of it on their own; and third, because even 
though it was growing, the sum total of the 
materials being produced appeared that it would 
always be a relatively finite, comprehensible set of 
objects. 
So here, let’s take another look at astronomic 
research and advances over the centuries. The 
most important clue to the truth lies in the 
millennium and a half between Ptolemy and 
Copernicus, which are just the most commonly 
recognized names. There were more, many more: 
• Ptolemy 100–178 AD 
• Abu Mashar, 805 or 806–886 AD 
• Donnolo, Shabbetai 913–ca. 982 
• Alhazen, 965–1039 
• Petrus Alfonsi 1062–1110? 
• Roger of Hereford fl. 12th cent. 
• Gervase of Canterbury ca. 1141–ca. 1210 
• Grosseteste, Robert 1175?–1253 
• Levi ben Gershom 1288–1344 
• Ibn al-Sh�ạtir, ʿAl �ı ibn Ibrāh�ım, 1304–1375 
• Heybech, Nikolaus von fl. 1389–1444 
• Al-Ahdab, Ishak ben Shlomo fl. 1396–ca. 1429 
• Zidek, Pavel 1413–1471 
• Moncada, Guglielmo Raimondo de ca. 1450–
ca. 1489 
• Copernicus 1473–1543 
• Martin Luther 1483–1546 
• Leoninus, Albertus 1534–1614 
• Brahe 1546–1601 
• Galileo 1564–1642 
• Kepler 1571–1630 
• Newton 1642–1727 
Obviously, we know even these names only 
because some form of their work, or reference to 
it, has survived. But not many people outside the 
history of science, astronomy, or other related 
fields would recognize all of them.  
Scholarly Communication     345 
Add to this ubiquity the much more recent 
decentralization of information creation, with 
users becoming creators as well; now that 
everyone is a producer of information, our sense 
of finity and control in the bibliographic world is 
truly obliterated. But perhaps that sense of finity 
and control was illusory all along. How many more 
people were active in astronomy over the 
centuries whose work has not survived or has not 
been widely known enough to be catalogued? 
How would we know? 
So we probably never did collect enough to 
preserve the human record in anything like the 
comprehensiveness we’d like to think. That 
realization is emerging only now that we’re aware 
of how much we can’t collect because of our 
current circumstances and how rapidly they have 
developed.  
Transience 
Following indirectly from information ubiquity is 
its transience or impermanence. For example, one 
recent work about YouTube constitutes a “book” 
entirely online (Juhasz, 2011), under the ongoing 
control of the contributors. It’s not only a 
treatment of YouTube, but a manifestation of its 
own subject. There’s an interesting wrinkle here 
that’s not immediately evident. This work’s 
significance is less about its form or its YouTube 
focus than the questions it forces regarding peer 
review and evaluating scholarship: The content of 
this online book isn’t fixed. The students own the 
pieces they’ve produced and can remove their 
material any time. Juhasz knows that’s likely to 
happen and notes that replacement content can 
always be added to fill the gaps (Parry, 2011). 
Our most traditional methods of assessment, on 
the other hand, have always assumed static 
content, in that a printed volume read 2 years ago 
will still have the same text and illustrations next 
year. We often review new scholarly work by 
placing it in context with the existing literature. As 
material and content become more ubiquitous 
and distributed, however, distinctions blur; If the 
work can change so substantially, beyond the 
usual range of updating editions, what are we 
really evaluating? The enduring value of the 
content, the impact of its production as a 
phenomenon, or the contemporaneous quality of 
its conception and execution? If “the book is so 
temporary” (Parry), then on what do we rely for 
assessing the quality of the scholarship? Five or 
ten years after its initial review, its composition 
will probably have changed, so what might its 
peer-reviewed status mean over time? Is it simply 
a new edition that calls for a new peer review? If 
it’s intended in the first place to be impermanent, 
should review take into account the work’s 
purpose? Would the fact that it has changed later 
on mean that it had successfully fulfilled its 
purpose, even if the content were no longer the 
same? It is more akin to a juried performance, or 
is it something else altogether? If we consider it 
critical material, then later on, when it becomes 
part of the existing literature, how does its 
transient nature affect our evaluation of still 
newer work to be compared to it? How do we 
begin reenvisioning our methods of evaluating 
scholarly work created under new publication 
models like this one? 
When the primary material is ephemeral, not 
merely uncertain of access due to format, but 
ephemeral in its content by explicit design, what 
happens to our own critical distance? What are 
the broader implications for scholarly 
communication over time? What distinctions do 
we draw between object and form or method? 
What remains, and in what ways does it matter 
what remains? 
For scholars of art and architecture, the latter 
questions aren’t new. For scholarly 
communication in general, Juhasz (2011) is 
fascinating partly because it raises so sharply the 
question of what a work is and demonstrates how 
fluid even basic precepts can become. Those 
precepts might have always been rather more 
fluid than we’ve been aware, simply because of 
the nature of publishing and the pace of 
advancement until recently.  
Which brings us back to “Prospect Theory” 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This article is 
important because it presented a brand-new 
theory on how people calculate the likelihood 
against the consequences of various alternative 
outcomes. Utility theory arose out of Pascal’s 
Wager. In a possibly outrageous 
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oversimplification, the question Pascal posed was 
whether to believe in God. The reasoning goes like 
this: If I choose to wager against God existing, I 
can have a good time on Earth but risk eternity in 
Hell if I’m wrong. If I’m right that God doesn’t 
exist, I lose nothing in the long run. If I choose to 
wager that God exists, I stand to gain eternity in 
Heaven in return for living according to God’s law. 
If I’m wrong that God exists, I don’t gain anything 
in the long run, and I’ve given up a lot of pleasure 
on Earth. Rationality dictates that I wager for 
God’s existence, since the utility of the Heaven 
prospect after a righteous lifetime outweighs the 
utility of pleasure on Earth with the possibility of 
eternal Hell. 
Utility theory, however, didn’t seem to account 
consistently enough for how people actually made 
decisions that carried risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979, p. 263), such as in gambling and purchasing 
insurance. When probability and rates of return 
are involved, such calculations as Pascal’s aren’t 
so simple. “Prospect Theory” closely examined 
probability and perceived probability via a number 
of experiments and games investigating how 
people responded to specific scenarios. 
One example from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) is 
the concept of probabilistic insurance. In the 
standard system, you purchase home insurance 
against the risk of fire. The insurance company is 
betting that nothing will happen to the home, and 
you’re betting that something will happen. If the 
premium is as much or more than the cost of a 
potential loss, purchasing the insurance doesn’t 
make sense. Put this way, utility theory seems 
adequate to explain the decision. 
The idea of probabilistic insurance illustrates more 
clearly how people actually think about insurance. 
The homeowner’s choices are modified to 
introduce a second layer of risk independent of 
the risk of fire: Pay half the premium, and there’s 
a 50% chance that a loss will be covered. If it is 
covered, then you pay the other half of the 
premium and the company pays for the loss. If it 
isn’t covered, you get your money back and pay 
for the loss yourself. What determines whether 
the loss is covered is unrelated to the risk of fire; 
the article’s example is that if the fire occurs on an 
odd-numbered day of the month, it’s covered, so 
you pay the other half of the premium and you’re 
covered. If the fire occurs on an even-numbered 
day, you get the premium back but no coverage 
(pp. 269–270). Kahneman & Tversky explain that 
“expected utility theory...implies that probabilistic 
insurance is superior to regular insurance.” 
However, regular insurance eliminates all the risk 
of loss from the fire, whereas probabilistic 
insurance actually introduces additional risk (p. 
270).  
In short, we might believe we’re making a choice 
between clear alternatives, with careful 
consideration of utility and likelihood, but very 
often, our choices merely minimize risk instead of 
eliminating it—and sometimes even increase it. 
We often do think in terms of gambling against 
the unforeseeable, but we don’t always realize 
that that’s what we’re doing. The way we make 
decisions, in other words, isn’t always what we 
think it is. 
In the academic library, our traditional method of 
selecting and acquiring was in case something 
would be needed, based on our particular 
institution’s mission and our knowledge of 
historical and/or current instruction and research. 
The large research libraries were thought of as the 
repository of the human record, preserving 
collected human knowledge for posterity. In 
smaller institutions, we’ve aimed for 
representative, not comprehensive, collections, 
partly because comprehensive collecting has been 
completely beyond our fiscal reach. The idea was 
to purchase what we could afford and what we 
really needed, creating an adequate basis for 
ongoing scholarly activity on our own campuses. 
Yet we still thought of our libraries as the official 
repository of human knowledge, and in acting 
conservatively just in case, we all too frequently 
engaged in what we thought was Pascal’s Wager. 
For example, cancelling newspaper microfilm 
because the title was available via an aggregator 
and having the publisher cancel its contract with 
that vendor years later. We might be said to have 
made what we thought was a simple utility 
decision, choosing the greatest benefit from 
amongst the alternatives by saving money and 
providing better access. The decision turns out 
later to have been a gamble, and a losing one at 
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that, given the astronomical cost of acquiring the 
material retrospectively. But this particular losing 
gamble is less a matter of underestimating risk 
than of not understanding that it existed in the 
first place, which is exactly what happens when 
we purchase insurance thinking that we’re 
eliminating all risk. The decision appears to be a 
simple utility-theory calculation. However, 
Pascal’s Wager identified a positive utility for only 
one decision/outcome set, with the others all 
neutral or negative. Deciding where to invest 
resources in a zero-sum situation, on the other 
hand, offers both positive and negative utility for 
each decision/outcome pair. The various apparent 
risks and benefits don’t always weigh clearly one 
way or another on the scales. 
What we haven’t understood in the academic 
library is where we inadvertently introduce risk in 
our decision making. The changes we’re now 
seeing in the publishing industry are making some 
of those risks clearer, and most of us grasp them 
better now; we know more about what questions 
to ask when allocating resources or negotiating 
for access to electronic materials in particular. We 
know now that access via an aggregator is less 
reliable than direct subscription, even if the 
aggregator appears more cost-effective. We know 
now that as print journals cease or move to online 
only by the dozen, we’re getting nervous about 
retaining access over the long term. We know 
now that there’s even a lot of uncertainty 
underlying our purchases of materials even with 
explicit perpetual-access rights directly from the 
publisher, and we know that those purchases are 
still something of a gamble. We don’t have any 
way of hedging our bets, but at least we now 
know that we’re betting in more complex ways 
than we thought.  
Understanding how we actually make decisions in 
uncertain cases is what Kahneman and Tversky 
were getting at. Reading that article first probably 
wouldn’t have changed our New York Times 
decision, since nobody knew what the risks might 
be, but reading it now helps us understand the 
decision. It also helps us examine new decisions 
with a better sense of how we’re likely to weigh 
the factors and what unknowns to think about 
going forward. 
In the world of academic collection management, 
we have decisions to make every day in times and 
conditions of what we consider grave risk in the 
broader cultural arena, and in the context not 
only of what we do historically, but of our 
historical sense of what we do. In the academic 
library, we all recognize that we can’t adequately 
absorb and respond to current and future changes 
either physically or fiscally. We can step out and 
lead in some ways, but on our campus, at least, 
our primary mission is to support our own 
curriculum and research, which means we have to 
retain some significant measure of reactivity. 
We all hear the constant calls to embrace change 
better in order to preserve the profession, the 
institution, and its relevance, all alongside a sense 
of impending disaster for the human record. I 
wonder whether we might try asking different 
questions. We can no longer afford to preserve 
the human record adequately, but it’s not 
necessarily clear that we ever actually did that. 
And given the whiplash changes in information 
formats, production, usage, and lifecycles, what 
happens if we try to conceive instead of our 
ongoing role in scholarly communication as that of 
mediators and facilitators, rather than as keepers 
or curators? Selecting materials has always meant 
mediating, and providing access has always meant 
facilitating; that’s part of what we know we’ve 
been doing all along. We’ve also long felt that our 
central role was to preserve the human record. 
What I suggest here is that the nature of the 
human record may be fundamentally changing, 
and it may have been changing for as long as 
we’ve had the concept of a human record. We’re 
noticing it only now that change has accelerated 
and accelerated so rapidly. Adapting to such 
changes means accepting some changes in our 
identity and self-image, but maybe only the parts 
that have been illusory or ephemeral all along. 
Choices remain, and to make them as effectively 
as possible, we should consider that our decision 
making involves more uncertainty than we’ve long 
thought. With new understanding of how we 
make our choices, we might need to accept that a 
certain amount of letting go is the best way to 
hold on.
348     Charleston Conference Proceedings 2012 
References 
Anderson, R. (2011). Why we do what we do, and what we should be doing instead. Address presented at 
Michigan Academic Libraries, Grand Rapids, MI, May 6. 
Berrett, D. (2012, October 8). Habits of mind. Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle. 
com/article/Habits-of-Mind-Lessons-for/134868/  
Juhasz, A. (2011). Learning from YouTube. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Retrieved from http://vectors.usc.edu/ 
projects/learningfromyoutube/ 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 
263–292. 
McClanahan, K., Wu, L., Tenopir, C., & King, D. (2010). Embracing change: Perceptions of e-journals by faculty 
members. Learned Publishing 23(3), 209–223. http://dx.doi.org/10.1087/20100304 
Parry, M. (2011, February 20). Free “video book” from MIT challenges limits of scholarship. Chronicle of 
Higher Education. Retrieved from http://chronicle.com/article/Free-Video-Book-From/126427/ 
Streitfeld, D. (2012, February 22). Amazon pulls thousands of e-books in dispute. New York Times. Retrieved 
from http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/amazon-pulls-thousands-of-e-books-in-dispute/    
The reach of “Prospect Theory.” (2011). The Chronicle of Higher Education. Retrieved 
from http://chronicle.com/article/The-Reach-of-Prospect-Theory/129687/ 
 
